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Who in their right mind would take 
on the task of trying to convey the 
state of current thought regarding 
how the human brain functions, as 
well as put forward a proposal for how 
to tie it all together, to both a non-
specialist and specialist audience, 
in a single volume? I cannot think of 
more than a few people on the planet 
who might have any chance at all of 
pulling it off without the hyperbole 
and sensationalism one often sees. 
Dana Ballard is one of those, and 
he does indeed pull it off. With any 
such attempt there are bound to be 
many points of contention — after 
all, as the author repeats throughout 
his book, there is still so much 
we do not understand about the 
brain, its structure, function, and 
behavior. Nevertheless, this is a very 
readable and much needed book. 
I can easily see it being a standard 
part of a reading list for graduate 
students starting off in neuroscience 
(computational or biological) or a core 
element of a graduate course. It would 
also be an excellent read for anyone 
seeking a snapshot of brain science. 
Even though this fi eld moves very 
quickly, adding many papers with new 
results and ideas daily, I feel Ballard’s 
book will remain a strong contribution 
for a long time to come.
Ballard introduces early in the 
book the premise of his central goal, 
the hierarchy of abstractions that 
represent brain computation. He does 
this in three ways. First, he shows 
the hierarchical spatial scales present 
in the central nervous system (from 
molecules, to synapses, neurons, 
networks, maps, systems, and fi nally, 
the central nervous system as a 
Book reviewCuwhole; Figure 1.3). Then, a description 
of similar, partly spatial, partly 
conceptual, scales for a computer is 
presented (starting with gates, circuits, 
microcode, assembly language, 
user programs and ending with the 
operating system; Table 1.1). Finally, 
he shows the levels of computational 
abstraction (Table 1.2). This latter is 
important, but perhaps more diffi cult 
to appreciate. However, it is critical 
for understanding the nature of the 
computational problem being solved 
and decomposing it into manageable 
chunks. But, let’s pause a bit here, 
and since the notion of hierarchical 
abstraction is at the core of the book’s 
main thesis, examine the concept a bit 
deeper.
A hierarchy is a construct humans 
have used since ancient times, 
appearing in organizations of all 
kinds, some with few levels (shallow) 
some with many (deep). Nobel 
laureate Herb Simon describes their 
utility in a classic 1962 paper “The 
Architecture of Complexity” [1]. He 
describes a hierarchy as “a system 
that is composed of interrelated 
subsystems, each of the latter 
being, in turn, hierarchic in structure 
until we reach some lowest level of 
elementary subsystem.” Simon notes 
that in many biological systems, a 
hierarchy is defi ned in spatial terms, 
in terms of elements that are part 
of some larger physical structure. 
Physical structures are composed 
of parts and one can describe this 
compositionality hierarchically (exactly 
as in Ballard’s Figure 1.3). Simon 
further mentions that there may 
be different kinds of organizational 
principles for hierarchies in addition 
to compositionality. These may all 
co-exist and thus interact within the 
same set of hierarchical elements. In 
computer science, hierarchical data 
structures, such as the tree, emerged 
early to capitalize on the effi ciency 
gains they provide and a variety of 
types of hierarchical structures are in 
common use.
Within the fi eld of vision science, the 
concept of hierarchical organization 
has played an important role since 
David Hubel and Torsten Wiesel 
fi rst described hierarchical neural 
structures in the visual cortex during 
the early 1960s, and computationally 
since Leonard Uhr introduced the rrent Biology 25, R693–R710, August 17, 2015 ©image pyramid in 1972. An image 
pyramid was a layered representation 
of an image, each layer being 
constructed out of mathematical 
operations performed on the image 
in the layer below. But hierarchies 
are not restricted to spatial, or visual, 
representations. Researchers on the 
topic of knowledge representation 
within artifi cial intelligence (AI) have 
put great effort into understanding 
how hierarchies can be defi ned and 
used along the additional dimensions 
of type, partition, generalization, 
classifi cation, inheritance and more 
[2,3]. 
Ballard begins his exploration 
of brain computation with a nice 
introductory chapter that explains the 
connections between computation in 
a brain and in a computer. Drawing 
this link is important because without 
it, a novice reader can easily go 
astray. The second chapter is a very 
well executed overview of the relevant 
brain science, useful for novices 
and experienced practitioners alike. 
Ballard provides all that the reader 
needs to understand the biological 
underpinnings of the rest of the 
book. Part II of this book dives into 
the specifi cs of modeling neurons, 
circuits, memory, visual maps, and 
behaviors. Neural coding and what it 
might represent is a major topic of this 
section of the book. Reinforcement 
learning methods have been strong 2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved R697
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enterprise, and it is not unexpected 
to fi nd a whole chapter, very well 
presented, on the topic. I particularly 
like the summary section 5.7, where 
a list of constraints that must be 
satisfi ed by programs in the brain is 
given.
Whereas Parts I and II focused 
on basic concepts and details of 
components, Part III puts these 
all together to see how they lead 
to behavior. The fi rst two chapters 
deal with the concept of routines — 
specialized programs that encode 
the sequence of actions, sensory 
or motor, that are required to carry 
out behaviors. This is a critical idea, 
without which the many specialized 
abilities we know are present in the 
brain have no means of combining 
to support complex human behavior. 
The concept is not simply a useful 
theoretical construct, as Ballard 
presents strong evidence for 
such routines in the brain. To me, 
research into such routines — their 
characteristics, their locus in the brain, 
their function, their computational 
embodiment — is among the most 
interesting future directions, and 
Ballard motivates a very useful 
foundation for this. The third chapter 
of Part III presents the last level of the 
hierarchy, the component that actually 
makes behavior happen — the 
operating system. Here is where all 
the routines fi nally come together and 
where critical functionality is added, 
without which normal behavior would 
be impossible. The overall brain must 
have some element that is able to 
monitor the execution of routines, to 
determine if that execution is going as 
expected, to determine when a task 
had been successfully completed, and 
to make changes to the routines if the 
execution is in some way inadequate. 
There are also myriad implementation 
details to handle. Ballard shows, 
largely through examples from his 
own work, how this supervision might 
proceed.
The fi nal part of the book, Part IV, 
deals with awareness. Although I 
can imagine that I might understand 
something about vision biologically 
and computationally, I really am out 
of my element when it comes to 
awareness. So, I read this as a test of 
how well Ballard provides material for R698 Current Biology 25, R693–R710, Augusthe novice. He fi rst addresses the task 
of making decisions, then considers 
how human emotions might come 
about and fi nally discusses the role 
of consciousness. In the decision-
making domain, he describes animal 
experiments that show how monkeys 
can learn to play a game, and thus 
their neural responses can be studied. 
However, a subtle point arises: the 
animal performs as required in order 
to solve the problem the human 
experimenter imposes on it, namely 
dehydration. The monkey does not 
play for the sense of fun — does this 
make a difference in how the results 
appear or are interpreted? A second 
question also arises when Ballard 
explains how game theory can be 
used to model the decision-making 
process itself. Is there a difference 
between using a mathematical 
abstraction such as game theory 
(or Bayesian probability, as another 
example) and the actual process that 
neurons execute? 
Nevertheless, this development has 
come a long way from neural codes, 
as described earlier in Part II. At this 
point in time one cannot say that 
the brain executes Bayes theorem 
or executes game theory. Does this 
distinction make a difference or does 
the mathematical abstraction suffi ce, 
and if so, how? These may not be 
easy questions to answer, but the 
book provides a good foundation for 
asking the right questions. 
Ballard then moves on to consider 
emotions, presenting a set of 
elements within his computational 
emotional hierarchy — language, 
signaling, cortex, limbic, 
hypothalamus and basic body needs. 
That all these components are needed 
seems clear, but this decomposition 
might be too abstract. The fi nal 
chapter deals with consciousness — 
to many, the biggest mystery about 
our brain. Whereas the proposed 
hierarchy is at least in part physical 
and compositional, consciousness is 
a property of the whole system, in my 
opinion, and seems more diffi cult to 
fi t. His fi nal description of the brain 
hierarchy of Table 11.1 goes from 
operating system at the top, through 
debugging, scheduler, programs, 
routines, data abstraction, neurons 
and synapses at the bottom. The top 
levels are suggested as necessary to t 17, 2015 ©2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reservaccommodate conscious behavior, 
and it is clear that being able to 
reason about what one is doing is part 
of awareness, but is that all? It is a 
topic that awaits additional research. 
An examination of how the 
human brain might perform its 
magic necessitates broad coverage 
of topics and in order to make it 
manageable (let alone fi t into book 
form) necessitates that some topics 
be addressed with broad brush 
strokes only. Sometimes, those broad 
strokes leave gaps; for this reviewer, 
those gaps are over issues around 
hierarchies, feedback, and attention. 
But Ballard anticipates such gaps. 
From in his preface: “The net result 
is that the descriptions of either 
side [biology and computation] may 
disappoint the specialist, but the focal 
intent is to point out connections that 
may promote new understanding”. 
I offer the following with the same 
constructive intent.
Some historical perspective on 
hierarchical organization has been 
given earlier. From that, the question 
that naturally arises is what kind of 
hierarchy is depicted in Tables 1.1 
and 1.2? The hierarchies presented 
include very different sorts of 
constructs and although synapses 
are part of neurons, they are not the 
only parts. Similarly, neurons are 
involved in data abstraction, but 
there is more to this too. Gates may 
be part of circuits, but assembly 
language is software that runs on the 
hardware of circuits. An operating 
system involves all of the lower 
level elements, but also resource 
management components such as 
time and memory. In one sense, each 
level is an abstraction of the previous; 
but what is being abstracted? 
And does it matter if not all the 
components within an abstraction are 
listed? An abstraction conveys the 
essential qualities of something more 
extensive or more general, providing 
the essence of that something. Are 
each of the elements listed in those 
tables the appropriate ‘essence’ of 
that level of abstraction? This is not 
easy to address. But, I think I would 
have preferred some discussion on 
the dimensions of abstraction that 
are involved, and on exactly what 
is being abstracted away and why 
that is appropriate. However, in a ed
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complicate the exposition and might 
bury Ballard’s main point. It just 
might be that Ballard made the right 
choice here with his chosen depth of 
treatment.
One also might wonder whether one 
could defi ne hierarchical organization 
principles for brain computation 
related to a sub-classifi cation of 
neural connections? In other words, 
are all neural connections — whether 
feedforward, lateral or feedback — 
for the same purpose? Could those 
organizational principles developed 
by AI researchers provide guidance 
for such a consideration? I would 
think that in the same way that there 
is a myriad of neuron types, each 
with different functionality, that there 
might be many types of connections 
among neurons, each with different 
characteristics and function. The only 
thing I can conclude is that Ballard’s 
abstraction hierarchy presents us 
with a great starting point, making 
clear the sorts of questions we need 
to consider in order to make further 
progress.
Another issue is that of feedback. 
Although Ballard does include 
feedback as part of his overall 
strategy, I was eager for more, but 
perhaps this was inevitable. Our 
understanding of the role (or most 
probably, roles) of feedback or 
recurrence in the brain is quite limited 
(see [4] for a brief overview). Herzog 
and Clarke [5] present convincing 
evidence suggesting that cortical 
processing is not purely hierarchical 
and feed-forward. They claim that 
in order to know how the visual 
system processes fi ne-grained 
information at a particular location it 
is necessary to integrate information 
about the surrounding context over 
the entire visual fi eld. Grouping 
and segmentation are crucial to 
understanding vision, and must be 
understood on a global scale. 
Their conclusions feed right into 
Ballard’s plan, it seems. Ballard 
describes a feedback role for learning 
weights within receptive fi elds, motor 
control feedback, how feedback from 
routines can adjust interpretation 
based on expectations, and more 
generally how feedback from one 
level can infl uence processing at 
lower levels. He correctly emphasizes Currthe importance of understanding 
feedback on p. 155: “it is unlikely that 
the cortex can be fully understood 
without accounting for their [feedback 
connections] purpose.” However, this 
critical aspect of brain computation 
doesn’t seem to make it smoothly into 
the abstraction hierarchy he proposes. 
Even the use of the term ‘abstraction’ 
comes with a tacit implication of 
a single direction — I cannot think 
of a term for the other direction. In 
other words, if the act of abstracting 
removes detail to leave the essence 
exposed (as discussed earlier), what is 
the action of adding back that detail? 
I suspect that Ballard believes in a 
broader role for feedback, with which I 
would fully agree, and feel this should 
have been more forcefully emphasized 
within his hierarchy.
My fi nal point concerns the nature 
and role of attention and attentional 
processing. Figure 8.2 summarizes 
how Ballard views attention and labels 
the attentional level of processing as 
the ‘debug’ level, that is, processing 
that simulates a task and determines 
if the execution of that task is 
conforming to expectations. The 
time scale at which this operates 
is 100 seconds. He also previously 
mentions attention in the context of 
‘changing the agenda’ (Section 6.5), 
a stimulus-based form of attention 
to potentially interesting locations in 
an image. The chapter continues by 
drawing an analogy with the famous 
Posner description of attention as 
consisting of alerting, orienting and 
executive components. However, 
research of the past 25 years has 
shown that the neurophysiology 
of attention is far more complex. 
For example, a well-established 
observation is that single neurons, 
almost everywhere within the visual 
cortex, can show different behaviors 
depending on attentional infl uences 
[6,7]. Moreover, there is a distinct 
temporal pattern to the emergence of 
these different behaviors throughout 
the cortex that can only be seen if 
one looks simultaneously at multiple 
areas and at a timescale where they 
are visible, 100–250 milliseconds. 
And there is more, as is easily seen 
in the two volumes cited above. I do 
not feel these can be relegated to the 
category of implementation detail; 
rather they are important constraints ent Biology 25, R693–R710, August 17, 2015 ©on whatever theory one might propose 
as explanation. 
However, the current state of 
experimental and theoretical work 
on attention provides little guidance 
for Ballard. The community has not 
yet converged onto answers for the 
big ‘what, where, how, why, when’ 
questions in attention. The real 
problem is that there are a variety 
of phenomena that are all grouped 
under the rubric of attention, when, 
in fact, a fi ner-grain taxonomy could 
be more illuminating [8]. As a result, 
as Ballard notes on p. 282, each 
of his uses of Posner’s three kinds 
of attention result in “interestingly 
different interpretations from those 
used in the psychological domain.” I 
think this is unavoidable if your goal 
is to make attention actually work. 
The computational approach requires 
that details be fi lled in, connections 
be completed, and performance from 
signal to agent action be evaluated. 
The experimental work is indispensible 
to be sure; but as Ballard shows, 
it must be complemented by 
computational considerations in order 
to connect observations.
The experimental and theoretical 
literature that is relevant to Ballard’s 
enterprise is vast and complicated. 
The range of possible interpretations 
that might arise from this literature is 
even larger. Ballard’s extensive set 
of references gives the reader one 
possible path through the vastness 
of experiment, observation and 
interpretation. It’s really all about 
how one chooses the constraints 
that lead to the path [9]. It is not an 
exaggeration to say that one can 
fi nd peer-reviewed results to support 
almost any theory or interpretation of 
results. And this can lead newcomers 
onto pathways of vast variety and 
uncertain utility. Ballard is not one of 
these, and his wealth of experience, 
impressive knowledge, technical 
talent, and insight, developed over 
decades of study, shine in this volume. 
He presents a pathway for theorizing 
about the brain that is plausible, 
broad, due to its coverage of early 
sensory issues and consciousness 
and social components alike, and very 
diffi cult to discount. All of my own 
comments, even those that appear 
critical, are in fact simply elaborations 
of portions of his pathway. 2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved R699
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What turned you on to biology in 
the fi rst place? I came to biology 
through a love of natural history. As a 
young boy, growing up in Canberra, the 
family home was on the other side of 
the road from a sheep station. Parrots 
would fl y in to drink at our fi sh pond 
and I have vivid memories of thornbills 
feeding a much larger cuckoo chick. I 
became a fanatical bird watcher until 
academic biology created different 
obsessions. Colleagues have come 
to biology for different reasons. Some 
want to understand how things work, 
to cure disease, or to fi nd an outlet for 
their mathematical talents. These initial 
motivations often have long-lasting 
effects on what questions they fi nd 
interesting. As a general rule, biologists 
who start as naturalists are more likely 
to be interested in questions of adaptive 
function and less motivated by questions 
of mechanism. As a university student, 
I gradually moved from a primary focus 
on traditional ecology to an interest in 
the natural history of the genome, but my 
ecological training remains of great value. 
It is the environment that selects which 
phenotypes transmit their genes to future 
generations. In this very real sense, it is 
ecology, mediated by phenotype, that 
determines genotype.
Who were your key early infl uences? 
My mother was a biology teacher. I 
received a broad education in classical 
biology at Macquarie University without 
taking a course in molecular biology (that 
was still possible). My most important 
mentors were Mark Westoby and Dick 
Frankham, my guides in ecology and 
genetics. Mark became my doctoral 
advisor. Naomi Pierce nominated me for 
a fellowship that brought me to Harvard.
If you had to choose a different fi eld 
of biology, what would it be? If I had 
the freedom of a doctoral student to 
take on a new area for evolutionary 
analysis it might be endocrinology. The 
major adaptive tradeoffs in organismal 
life histories are mediated by hormones 
that constitute summaries, one might 
say ‘principal components’, of where 
an organism stands in the adaptive 
space of life-history tradeoffs. A better 
understanding of these tradeoffs 
should illuminate the organization of the 
endocrine system and an adaptationist 
perspective on endocrinology should 
inform understanding of life-history.
Which paper has most infl uenced 
you? Much of my career has been spent 
exploring the implications of Robert 
Trivers’ paper on parent–offspring confl ict 
from 1974. Many at the time rejected 
the concept because it seemed obvious 
that parents obtain their fi tness through 
offspring and what is best for one should 
be best for the other. Forty years on, I 
still hear versions of these arguments. 
Part of the resistance is a trivial 
misunderstanding. The theory of parent–
offspring confl ict defi nes the conditions 
under which interests confl ict but at the 
same time defi nes the conditions under 
which they coincide. Cooperation and 
confl ict are two sides of one coin. Yet, 
one often hears argument of the form 
“parents have evolved to care for their 
offspring, therefore there is no confl ict”. 
The premise is impeccable while the 
conclusion is fallacious, but I suspect 
resistance to parent–offspring confl ict 
has deeper roots because it challenges 
some deeply held myths about parents 
and offspring in particular and the 
evolutionary process in general.
What do you mean by ‘myths’? We 
have a deep desire to see the natural 
world as fundamentally benefi cent and 
natural selection as promoting individual 
well-being. Maximizing the probability of 
survival of an individual child is different 
from maximizing the number of surviving 
children. Therefore, adaptations of 
parents are expected to balance benefi ts 
to particular children against costs to 
fertility. Modern parents are not fi tness 
maximizers, but our psychology has been 
shaped by this evolutionary trade-off. 
We balance parental responsibilities with 
other demands but feel uncomfortable 
with the suggestion that sometimes 
our needs are ranked above those of 
our children. We tell ourselves, and our 
children, we want only what is best for 
them. But our children recognize such 
parental protestations as self-serving.
Q & ABallard roots his development in 
the language of computation, the 
only tool available with which we can 
express the full breadth of necessary 
concepts, from mathematics to 
logic, representations, input and 
output, algorithms, control, systems, 
memory, interaction, and more (see 
also [8]). He uses this full breadth 
of computational methodologies far 
more effectively than seen previously 
and thus makes a more powerful 
statement for their utility than David 
Marr or others. 
The path Ballard presents is 
perhaps best considered using 
his own main argument: it is an 
abstraction. As an abstraction, and 
if a correct abstraction, future efforts 
should be able to defi ne the sub-
elements of his plan in such a way so 
that the overall plan remains intact 
and does not deviate. How will we 
know if this is the correct path? What 
does it predict and how can we test 
those predictions? The path laid out 
is suffi ciently rich to motivate much 
experimental work that would answer 
these questions. I feel that Ballard has 
successfully navigated the oceans of 
available constraints, and plotted a 
course that will provide guidance for 
quite some time to come. This book is 
a ‘must read’ for anyone interested in 
understanding the human brain.
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